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COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF LANDOWNER FOR POLLUTION
OF PERCOLATING WATERS
In recent years it has become apparent that a great migration is
taking place from the cities to the small suburban areas which lie at
the edges of the cities. Large undeveloped tracts of land beyond the
limits of the city have been opened to both residential and industrial
use. In many cases, for reasons financial or political, the cities have
been unable or unwilling to extend their ancient and often over-
burdened water and sewage disposal facilities to these areas. Lacking
the degree of community organization necessary to construct their own
systems, the new subdivisions and developments have constructed
private wells and septic tanks to an unprecedented extent. It requires
no great imagination to foretell that, in some instances, septic tank
seepage may pollute the soils and rock strata surrounding the tank
with harmful bacteria or noxious substances, that the underground
waters which percolate through such soils may be similarly polluted,
and that costly and often irreparable consequences might attend the
pollution of wells supplied by such waters. Even the most rigid
enforcement of health controls may well prove inadequate to meet
the problem, for it is hardly to be expected that last-century regula-
tions can control the new migration.
Percolating waters have been properly defined as
* .. those which ooze, seep, or filter through the soil beneath the
surface, without a defined channel, or in a course that is unknown
and not discoverable from surface indications without exca-
vation for that purpose.'
Artesian waters have been held to be percolating waters.2 It is assumed
that a well is filled from percolating waters unless there is proof to
the contrary by clear and convincing evidence.3
Upon discovering that his well has become polluted, the injured
party has available, as possible theories of action, the whole spectrum
I United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyer, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1925). They have been
defined also in the common law sense as vagrant, wandering drops moving by
gravity in any and every direction along the line of least resistance. City of
Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156 Cal. 603, 105 Pac. 755 (1909).2 Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903) ; Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141
Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1903) ; Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power &
Light Co., 100 Minn. 481, 111 N.W. 391 (1907).
3 Bristol v. Cheatham, 73 Ariz. 228, 240 P.2d 185 (1952) ; Republic Steel Corp.
v. Stracner, 246 Ala. 620, 21 So.2d 690 (1945) ; Woodward Iron Co. v. Earley,
247 Ala. 556, 25 So2d 267 (1946); Pecos County Water Control & Imp. Dist.
No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civil Court of Appeals, 1954); Hinton
v. Little, 50 Idaho 371, 296 Pac. 581 (1931); Evans v. City of Seattle, 182
Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935).
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of trespass, negligence, nuisance and strict liability, but may be faced,
in some jurisdictions, by a denial of any legally-protected right to
unpolluted percolating water. The merits of each theory shall be taken
up individually, but we shall first examine the question of the legal
recognition of the right itself.
A. RIGHT To UNDEFILED WATERS-DENIED
This classification has generally become known as damnum absque
injuria. Literally, the phrase means a loss without an injury, and in
legal contemplation has come to mean an injury without legal redress. 4
The doctrine goes back to the English case of Acton v. Blundell5
which held,
* * * the person who owns the surface may dig therein and
apply all that is there found to his own purpose at his free will
and pleasure; and that if in the exercise of such right, he inter-
cepts or drains off the water collected from underground
springs in his neighbour's well, this inconvenience to his neigh-
bour falls within the description of damnum asque injuria
which can become the ground of an action.6
This principle found its way into American jurisprudence in the
case of Brown v. IlliusT in 1857. The startling point is that, while
this case serves as the leading case for the theory of damnum absque
injuria as applied to percolating water pollution, it involves not per-
colating waters but surface waters. The court said by way of dicta
that the trial court was correct in its instructions8 that the defendant
was not guilty of negligence in producing the injury, in that he had
4 Brown v. Illius. 25 Conn. 583 (1857).
5 12 Mees. & Wels. Rep. 324 (1843).
6 For a discussion of the historical basis of this aspect, see Rose v. Socony-
Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 Atd. 627 (1934); Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas,
41 Neb. 662, 59 N.W. 925 (1894) ; and, Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co.,
121 Conn. 579, 186 Atl. 629 (1936).
7Supra, note 4.8 Plaintiff used the water from his well to run a steam engine and as drinking
water for his workers. Defendant, who lived within close proximity of the
plaintiff's well, deposited noxious matter on the ground which was later washed
into plaintiff's well by surface waters. The trial court instructed the jury as
follows: "You will inquire by what mode the well became affected; whether
the noxious substances filtered through the earth to the well, in consequence
of ordinary rains, in the usual mode of the spreading of such substances,
without corrupting the underground water course that supplied the same; or
whether they filtered through the earth and corrupted the underground water
course that supplied the well, and in that mode, and that only, spoiled the same.
If the well was corrupted in that mode, it is difficult to see how the defend-
ant could be guilty of negligence in corrupting the same. He had no means of
knowing that the water course was there. No prudence could guard against
such a result, and without negligence the defendant would not be liable. But
the plaintiffs claim that soon after the mischief began, they complained to the
defendant respecting it. This is not denied by the defendant. You will then
inquire, whether the exercise of such care as I have described would have
prevented a continuance of the mischief. If it would, the defendant was at
fault in that he did not exercise such care, providing he did not, and for the
injury resulting from such neglect (if any) he is responsible."
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no means of knowing that the 'water course was there, but was wrong
in holding that "if after receiving this information, he could have
prevented a continuance of the injury by the use of reasonable care,
he was liable for damages resulting."
The real philosophy behind the doctrine was clearly and suc-
cinctly set out in Upjohn v. Board of Health of Richland.10 In it
Justice Cooley says:
But if withdrawing the water from one's well by an excava-
tion on adjoining lands will give no right of action, it is difficult
to understand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of the
adjoining premises can be actionable, when there is no actual
intent to injure, and no negligence. The one act destroys the
well, and the other does no more; the injury is the same in
kind and degree in the two cases.
The first case which was decided directly upon the question of lia-
bility for pollution of percolating waters as such was Dillon v. Acme
Oil Co.11 Here the defendant had had occasional leaking and spilling
of acids, chemicals and refuse water which had saturated the ground
and percolated into plaintiff's well. The court followed the Brown
case 2 explicitly; and, in doing so, said that it is only in an exceptional
case that an owner will know beforehand that his works (use of his
property) will affect his neighbor's well or water supply. The court
then concludes that, in the absence of both negligence and knowledge
of the subterranean water-course, if the business is legitimate and
operated with care and skill, there will be no liability for contamina-
tion. This decision has since been reaffirmed" as the law of New York
and presumably14 is still the law in that state today.
The history of this doctrine in Kentucky is quite interesting, in
that the principle was at first rejected, and then, by subsequent de-
cisions, adopted at least in effect. In its first decision on point, Kinnaird
v. Standard Oil Co., 5 the court states that the owner of land, however
innocent he might be, has no right to pollute or contaminate the water
so that, when it reaches his neighbor's land, it is in such a condition
that it is unfit for use by either man or beast. In its next applicable
case, Long v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,"6 the court effectively
9 It is to be especially noted that only the latter part of the holding of the
supreme court is dicta.
LO46 Mich. 542, 9 N.W. 845 (1881).
1149 Hun. 565, 2 N.Y.Supp. 289 (1888).
12 Supra, note 4.
13 Thompson v. Board of Education of Union Free School, 124 Misc. Rep. 840,
209 N.Y. Supp. 362 (1925) ; Easton v. State, 153 Misc. 395, 275 N.Y.Supp. 119
(1934); app'd, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.Supp. 809 (1935); aff'd, 271 N.Y.
507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1936).
14 Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954).
15 89 Ky. 468, 12 S.W. 937 (1890).
1 128 Ky. 26, 107 S.W. 203 (1908).
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reverses itself by a very dubious distinction. Defendant had struck
and killed a heifer, and had buried it on the right of way seventy feet
from plaintiff's well. The well became polluted. The court said:
If the owner of the land may divert the water from his
neighbor's well," it is hard to understand why he should be
responsible in damages when, without fault on his part, he
accidentally pollutes the water by burying a dead body on his
own land without reason to suppose that the effect of this would
be to pollute his neighbor's spring. The rule is elementary that
a person is not liable for a mere accident which ordinary care
on his part could not have anticipated or guarded against. If, in
the lawful use of his property, a man accidentally does an injury
to his neighbor which ordinary prudence would not have antici-
pated to result from his act, it is damnum absque injuria. The
law only requires of a man that in exercising his legal rights he
shall exercise them with such regard for the rights of others
as the circumstances demand of a person of ordinary prudence.
There are a few cases in America following the rule laid down
in Rylands v. Fletcher, but the entire trend of modern authority
is now the other way .... An accident is inevitable if the per-
son by whom it occurs neither has nor is legally bound to have
sufficient power to avoid it. In such a case the essential element
of a legal duty is wanting; and it cannot be a case of negli-
gence. Therefore no one can be made responsible for damages
caused to another by an act which is strictly lawful under all the
circumstances, unless he has been negligent in the manner of
doing the act. We therefore conclude that a person who buries
a dead body on his own land is not an insurer, and is not liable
if his neighbor's spring is thereby polluted.
The Kentucky court has held that placing a privy within 150 feet of a
well is not an act involving an anticipation of future damages, 18 nor
was the owner of a coal mining operation to anticipate that his escaping
water would pollute a near-by well. 9 In the latest case2" to come down
in Kentucky, the doctrine of the Long case 21 is adhered to in principle,
if not in name. Plaintiff's well became polluted with sulphur, and he
charged defendant with permitting the escape of this surphur. The
court said that plaintiff could only recover upon negligence or nui-
sance. It found there was no negligence, as the defendant followed
approved methods. The court then commented further on its "reason-
able use" theory, rejecting the English rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and
37 It is to be noted in the Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co. case, supra, the court
said, "There is a manifest distinction between the right of the owner of land
to use the underground water that originates from percolation or is found in
hidden veins and the right to contaminate it so as to injure or destroy the
water when passing to the adjoining land of his neighbor."
Is Davis v. Atkins, 18 Ky. L. R. 73, 35 S.W. 271 (1896).
19North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 244 Ky. 639, 51 S.W.2d 960 (1932).
20 Supra, note 1.
21 Supra, note 16.
[Vol. 39
COMMENTS
the doctrine that a landowner is an insurer of his neighbor's property;
but declaring,
... in the absence of negligence there is no liability if there was a
legitimate and reasonable use. The doing of a lawful thing in a
a careful and prudent manner cannot be a nuisance.
It would seem that Kentucky, therefore, is generally committed to the
theory of damnum absque injuria in ordinary pollution cases. 22
Pennsylvania is another state to adopt this theory. Originally this
jurisdiction allowed recovery in nuisance,2 but in an early case24
it was held that the plaintiff can hold the defendant liable only if the
injury was plainly to be anticipated and easily preventable with reason-
able care and expense. The latest case2 5 in that state reaffirmed the
position:
Interference with subterranean waters seeping into private
wells shall be treated as damnum absque injuria where no
negligence causing the injury is found.
The latest state to adopt this policy is Rhode Island. 2r The well
and stream of a farm became polluted by reason of defendant's storing
and processing of petroleum on his land. The court in arriving at its
decision denying recovery relied heavily upon public policy.
To give to others a right in such waters may subject a land-
owner to liability for consequences, arising from a legitimate
use of his land, which he did not intend and which he could not
foresee. If, in the process of refining petroleum, injury is oc-
casioned to those in the vicinity, not through negligence or lack
of skill or the invasion of a recognized legal right, but by the
contamination of percolating waters whose courses are not
known, we think that public policy justifies a determination that
such harm is damnum absque injuria.
Today the principle of damnum absque injuria governs the problem
of percolating water pollution in the states of Michigan,2 7 New York,
28
Kentucky, 29 Pennsylvania, 30 and Rhode Island.3 1 They hold that the
owner of property may use percolating waters beneath his surface for
2 2 Unless there is absolute proof of causation, the case will not go to the jury.
This is demonstrated in the case of Rogers v. Bond Brothers, 279 Ky. 239, 130
S.W.2d 22 (1939). Defendant operated the only tie plant in the general area
in which creosote had polluted the water supply. The court said this, however,
was merely circumstantial evidence and such was not sufficient to send the
case to the jury.
23 Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861) ; Haugh's Appeal, 102 Pa. 42
(1883).
24 Collins v. Chartiers Val. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 At. 1012 (1890).
25 Schlichtkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co., 301 Pa. 553, 152 Atl. 829 (1930).
26 Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 Atl. 627 (1934).
27 Joldersma v. Muskegon Development Co., 286 Mich. 520, 282 N.W. 229 (1938).
28 Supra, notes 13, 14.
29 Supra, note 20.
30 Supra, note 25.
31 Supra, note 26.
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all purposes properly connected with the use, enjoyment and develop-
ment of the land itself; but is forbidden to use it for purposes not
connected with the beneficial enjoyment of the land.
There are some weaknesses in this doctrine, however. As was
pointed out earlier, it is based upon dicta from a case not pertaining
directly to percolating water. The logical adequacy of arguing that,
because one has a right to withdraw all the water from the ground
and therefore deprive a neighbor of his water, he also has a right
to pollute and contaminate the water, is extremely suspect. The courts
have also been guilty of sanctioning difference without distinction
in applying opposite rules to percolating waters and underground
streams. 32 Insofar as Brown z. Illius3 constitutes the precedent for
the damnum absque injuria decisions, it should be pointed out that the
decision of that case is no longer law in Connecticut.3 4 In overruling
the Brown case, the Connecticut court candidly stated that today per-
colating waters are distinguishable from the earth itself, and that
modem science has erased the old mystery of how percolating waters
are wont to move through the substratum. Changed knowledge
prompts a changed rule of law.
B. RIGHT To UNDEFILED WATERS-AFFIRMED
The right to recover for the pollution of percolating waters is based
upon the English case of Ballard v. Tomlinson.-5 This case held that
while there is an unlimited right to use percolating water, contamina-
tion of such water so as to render it unfit for use when it comes onto
a neighbor's land is a violation of the neighbor's rights for which an
action can be maintained.
The states that have allowed recovery have held that there is a
valid distinction between the right of the owner to use underground
water and the right to contaminate it.36 As stated in Gilmore v. Royal
Salt Co.:37
Some of the courts are very willing to assert that a land-
owner may maliciously deprive his neighbor of a water supply
by pumping or draining it away, but at the same time they assert
that he can not effect such deprivation by polluting the source of
supply. It could not for a moment be conceded that there was
a right to pollute the water, and the fact that there is no such
3 2 It is upon this point that a strong concurring though dissenting opinion was
written in Brown v. Illius, supra, note 4. As is stated in Rose v. Socony-
Vacuum Corp., supra, note 26, "The rationale of these opinions is that the
courses of subterranean waters are as a rule indefinite and obscure and, there-
fore, the rights relating to them can not well be defined as in the case of sur-
face streams."
33 Supra, note 4.
34 Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal and Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186 Ati. 629 (1936).
35 24 Am. L. Reg. 634.
36 Supra, note 15.
3 84 Kan. 729, 115 Pac. 541 (1911).
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right shows that the rights with respect to percolating waters
are not absolute, but correlative, and that each landowner
must, in using his own property, see that he does not injure
his neighbor. A landowner will not be permitted to collect upon
his premises injurious or offensive material in a place where it
will be likely to find its way, by the action of percolating water,
into his neighbor's well.
Such jurisdictions hold that whatever may be the rights of a land-
holder in either percolating water or defined and known subsurface
streams, he cannot place anything in either which will pollute the
springs or wells of his neighbors; and if he does, he is liable for the
damages that result.38 A person has no right to befoul, corrupt or
poison underground water, so that when it reaches his neighbor's land
it will be unfit for use by either man or beast. This is good morals as
well as good law.3 9
Some courts40 derived the right to unpolluted percolating water by
analogy. They say that the owner of the land has the same rights
in the percolating water as he has to the use and enjoyment of the air
that is around and over his premises. As it can scarcely be contended
that a landholder can poison the atmosphere with noxious odors that
reach the dwelling of his neighbor, so is it wrong to pollute the water
underground.
Once the right to reasonable purity of percolating waters is
postulated, the only remaining problem concerns the grounds on which
the suit should be brought. We shall now review the four grounds
chiefly relied upon in the decisions.
I. TREsPAss
At first glance the ground of trespass would seem to be a valid one
on which to bring suit. It has been held that where one has filth
deposited on his premises, he must take care to see that it does not
trespass.41 And this rule will apply where the objectionable matter per-
meates the soil superficially and by action of the elements reaches the
soil of another.4 2 This suggests that liability in this class of cases rests
in trespass.
There have been only three cases in the field which expressly con-
sidered trespass as a possible basis for recovery. One4O 3 of these is of
little persuasiveness since liability was based primarily on a statute, and
there is no discussion of the elements necessary for trespass. However,
at least nominally, recovery was allowed upon a trespass theory. Of
n Killian v. Killian, 175 Ala. 224, 57 So. 825 (1912).
3 Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927).4 0 Kinnard v. Standard Oil Co., supra, note 13; Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe Cc.
153 Pa. 366, 26 At. 644 (1893).41 Tenant v. Goldwin, I Salk 360 (1705).4 2 Supra, note 26.
43 Jackson v. United States Pipe Line Co., 325 Pa. 436, 191 At. 165 (1937).
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the two cases remaining, one44 was in a state recognizing generally a
right of action for pollution of percolating water and the other 45 was
not. Both denied recovery. In the former case the plaintiff's well
became polluted and she sued the defendant, a filling station owner, on
the grounds of case and trespass. There had been leakage from his
underground storage tanks. There was sufficient evidence to sustain
the action on the case but not on trespass. The distinction as drawn
in this case between trespass and trespass on the case is in the directness
or immediacy of the injury. An injury is considered immediate, and
therefore a trespass, when it is directly occasioned by the act com-
plained of and not merely a consequence resulting from it.
In the latter case the plaintiff had a well which became polluted
with gasoline. A chemist stated that, in his opinion, the gasoline was
of the same kind as the defendant sold and whose tanks were located
75 feet from plaintiff's well. In the original suit plaintiff charged
defendant with nuisance, negligence and trespass. Later, plaintiff with-
drew the charge of nuisance and negligence and relied solely upon
trespass. In finding for the defendant the court held that trespass is an
intentional harm; and while the trespasser need not intend or expect
the damaging consequences of his intrusion, he must intend the act
which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion. The intrusion
must either be the immediate or inevitable consequence of what he
willfully does, or his act must be so negligent as to amount to willful-
ness. The court then goes on to reiterate the New York rule that
defendant would not be liable even for deliberately placing the polluting
material in the ground, unless it was proved that defendant had good
reason to know or expect that the percolation of the subterranean
waters would carry it to plaintiff's land.
It would appear from the two preceeding cases that trespass is a
valid ground for recovery only if the case falls within its rather strict
limits. In the ordinary case, lawyerlike prudence would suggest basing
the action for pollution of underground waters upon another and more
firmly precedented ground.
II. NEGLIGENCE
The two most frequently accepted bases of relief for contamination
of percolating water are negligence and nuisance. Of the two, negli-
gence seems to be most favored by the courts. 46 Two early cases in
Massachusetts set up negligence as the basis of recovery for the pollu-
tion of wells. In the former 47 the court held that if the water was
rendered unfit for use by the negligent escape of defendant's gas, the
44 Pan American Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 228 Ala. 372, 153 So. 616 (1934).
45 Supra, note 14.
46 Trillingham v. Alaska Housing Authority, 109 F. Supp. 924 (1953).
47 Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 87 Mass. 213 (1862).
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plaintiff might recover for the injury. In the latter case48 the plaintiff
had constructed a well in his cellar. The defendant next door con-
structed a vault in his barn and allowed manure to accumulate therein.
Later, by percolation, plaintiff's well became polluted. The court held
that the defendant was bound to construct his vault so that the contents
should not percolate into plaintiff's well, and that such percolations
were evidence of negligence upon which the plaintiff was entitled to
recover. Negligence has since been found as basis for recovery in
New Jersey 49 for the accumulation of waste material on the land; in
Illinois5" under a statute proscribing nuisance for escape of salt water;
and in Alabama. 51
A plaintiff relying upon negligence as a basis of recovery in these
cases, however, is often defeated by his inability to sustain his burden
of proving the facts. He must prove the specific acts or omissions
relied on to constitute the negligence, the causal connection with the
injury, and the reasonable foreseeability of harm.
In Bollinger v. Mungle52 the plaintiff lived across the street from
defendant's filling station. Her well became polluted from his under-
ground storage tanks. She was unable to show any actual negligence.
The court held that to rely upon negligence she must prove negligence
either in the original construction and installation of the gasoline tank
and pump or by failure to repair or remedy defects in the equipment
which were either known to him or by the exercise of ordinary care
could have been discovered by him and remedied.
It is always a very difficult matter to prove the fact of negligence
against a defendant when the property on which the alleged negligence
occurs is entirely within his control. Because of this, some courts have
48 Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).4 9 Ballantine & Sons v. Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, 76 N.J. L. 358, 70
At. 167 (1908) ; Same case again--86 N.J. L. 331, 91 At. 95 (1914). The court
held that a gas manufacturing company has not the right to use its works in
the manufacturing of gas in such manner as to accumulate polluting matter
upon its land, negligently allowing it to percolate through the soil and con-
taminating the well water of its neighbors. The owner of the soil has not an
absolute right in his percolating water.
50 Phoenix v. Graham, 349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1953).
This was a case in which the defendant, lessee of the plaintiff, deposited salt
water which later polluted the well of the lessor. The court held that the de-
fendant was liable for this injury, not based upon nuisance as under the
statute, but upon negligence.51 Peerson Drilling Co. v. Scoggins, 261 Ala. 284, 74 So.2d 450 (1954). Plaintiff
bought land with the mineral and mining rights excepted. Defendant, who
owned these rights, while negligently drilling for oil, caused the water in
plaintiff's well to become unfit for human consumption. The defendant raised
the defense that the fee as owned by plaintiff had the mineral rights excepted,
including the percolating water. If this were true, defendant would not be
liable. The court held, however, that the term mineral and mining rights
should be given its ordinary and common meaning, and so construed, plaintiff
was not deprived of his right to the subterranean waters beneath the surface
of his land.
52175 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. 1943).
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applied res ipsa loquitur as the basis of negligence. In Texas Co. v.
Giddings 3 the court held that where, from the nature of the case, the
complainant would not be expected to know the exact cause or the
precise negligent act, and where the facts are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant, it is sufficient in a general way to allege
negligence. In another case 54 the court found negligence because the
gasoline storage tanks were under the supervision, maintenance and
control of the defendant. In Pine v. Rizzo55 the court held:
Before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked to
justify the inference of negligence on the part of the defendant,
the plaintiff must prove what caused the damages and that the
'thing' causing said damage was under the control or manage-
ment of the defendant or his servants, since the doctrine does
not go to the extent of implying that one may, from the mere
fact of injury, infer what physical act produced the injury.
Our discussion of the cases up to this point has not emphasized the
difficulty of showing a causal connection between the original act and
the resulting damage. However, this is a problem of proof which must
be faced on whatever theory plaintiff elects to proceed. The difficulty
of such proof became apparent in Enders v. Sinclair Refining Co.56
Plaintiff had a well, located 675 feet from defendant's bulk plant, which
became contaminated with petroleum. Defendant had lost by leakage
2500 gallons of petroleum in the preceding three year period. The
plaintiff in his complaint charged defendant with having negligently
permitted the petroleum products to escape from the storage tanks and
to find their way into the well of the plaintiff. The court, in holding
for the defendant, stated:
There is no preponderance of evidence ot a causal connection
between the loss of the petroleum products and the polluted well.
Under some circumstances the plaintiff might establish his claim
by a process of elimination. If there was no other place where
petroleum products were kept or stored in or near the plaintiff's
premises and it was established that after the escape of a large
quantity of petroleum products upon the defendant's premises,
plaintiff's well was polluted, there might be an inference that the
escaped petroleum products had found their way to plaintiff's
well from defendant's premises. The burden of showing that
there was no other possible source of pollution was upon the
plaintiff. The defendant was not required to prove that pollution
from other sources did enter plaintiff's well, unless and until the
plaintiff showed there was no other possible source of pollution.
Mere contamination of a well is not sufficient to establish causation.7
53148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. 1912).
54 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Bennett, 123 F2d 884 (1941).
55 186 Okla. 35, 96 P.2d 17 (1939).56 220 Wis. 254, 263 N.W. 568 (1936).
57 Supra, notes 46, 51.
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A causal connection has been denied where there are two possible
sources.58 It requires some competent testimony to establish a relation-
ship between the alleged source and the injury.59
Causation is usually determined either by direct evidence or by
inference. The usual method of establishing such fact by direct proof
is to get a qualified person to deposit colored water, violent dye or
potassium iodide into the suspected source; and, if it shows up in the
polluted well,60 such fact will prove the source. While causation can
be established inferentially by a process of elimination, the burden
is on the plaintiff to eliminate all possible sources other than the
defendant's premises.61 In one case, proof of the fact of actual pollu-
tion and of the direction of the percolation was held sufficient.6 2
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to find causation ;63 but recovery
cannot be had by merely adding inference to inference or presumption
to presumption; and the lack of evidence cannot be supplied by deduc-
tion.6 The nature of the surrounding circumstances may also give
rise to an inference of causation.65 Obviously, the weight of such
evidence is for the jury.e6
The final problem of proof is the question of foreseeability. It is
upon this point that the minority of states which deny any right to
unpolluted percolating water hold, as a matter of law, that a land-
owner cannot anticipate an injury from a lawful act. The reasoning
of the majority on this point has seldom been discussed but it seems
to be based upon two decisions. In one6 7 the court held that, under a
typical set of facts, there was no pretense of a sudden and unavoidable
accident whichcould not have been foreseen or guarded against by due
care. The other case, referred to above, is Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 68
in which plaintiff's well became polluted. Defendant had a condense
well (dry well) on his property which was located 492 feet from the
plaintiff's well. This condense well was to receive all the waste
products from defendant's gas works. In this case the court stated:
Defendant contends no action as he had no notice of the injury.
We see no force in this contention. It is true some of the cases
base the right to recover upon defendant's knowledge that he
was committing the injury; but the injury was as great before
as after notice. An action in tort is not a proceeding to punish a
58 Supra, note 1, 22.
59 Supra, note 27.
60 Love v. Nashville Agricultural & Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W.
304 (1922).6 1 Supra, note 56; Haveman v. Beulow, 36 Wash2d 185, 217 P.2d 313 (1950).
62 Cities Service Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 1466, 98 P.2d 1114 (1940).
63 Supra, note 39.
64 Shell Oil Co. v. Blubaugh, 199 Okla. 1353, 185 P.2d 959 (1947).65 Hall v. Galey, 126 Kan. 699, 271 Pac. 319 (1928).




defendant for a willful act, but is to compensate the plaintiff
for the invasion of his rights. It was not necessary, in order to
constitute the pollution of the well a tort, that it should be done
willfully. The most that can be said is that the defendant would
not be liable for damages unless the injury was one which was
the natural and probable consequence of those acts. While the
defendant may not have known, and probably did not know, that
its condense well would pollute the plaintiff's well, it was bound
to know that the natural and probable consequence of collecting
waste matter in its condense well would be the injury of some
wells which might be connected with the condense well by the
strratum of sand referred to.
Therefore the question whether or not one is well advised to
prosecute his well pollution case on the ground of negligence will
depend upon the amount of evidence he is able to procure on the
factual issues of negligence, causation, and foreseeability.
III. NUISANCE
This theory of liability includes what is generally called nuisance
in fact. It might be well to repeat at the outset that the same burden
of proving causation attends the nuisance case as has been examined
with respect to negligence.
6 9
This theory of recovery is established by numerous early cases.
In Brown v. Illius" Justice Ellsworth wrote a concurring opinion
which has since become the law in Connecticut. He contended therein
that one cannot use his land as to injure another, since such use is a
nuisance and is one whether the source of injury be above or below
the ground. The court in Clark v. Lawrence71 declared that a nuisance
is an act which will produce irreparable mischief. Pennsylvania 71
held a defendant was liable for the pollution of a well from substances
left on the ground on a theory of nuisance. Kansas 73 held that no one
has a right to deposit refuse matter, whether in itself offensive or not,
by which the water underlying his neighbor's land might become
effected through percolation. Washington 74 has held that the dumping
69 Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Decker, 32 F.2d 66 (1929).70 Supra, note 4.
7159 N.C. 83 (1860). The defendant was a trustee of a cemetery in which there
had been at least two burials close to plaintiff's well. The water in the well
became contaminated. Justice Battle wrote, "Whenever, then, it can be clearly
proved that a place of sepulture is so situated, that the burial of the dead there,
will endanger life or health, either by corrupting the surrounding atmosphere,
or the water of wells or springs, the court will grant its injunctive relief upon
the ground that the act will be a nuisance of a kind likely to produce irrepa-
rable mischief, and one which cannot be adequately redressed by an action at
law.... (I)n a case like the present . .. the thing complained of is certainly
of the character of a nuisance."
72 Supra, note 23.
73 Supra, note 37.74 Havenan v. Beulow, supra, note 61.
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of waste water into a sump, so as to pollute a neighbor's well by
percolation, is a nuisance.
The courts which follow the nuisance theory in pollution cases
apply a kind of reverse reasoning. First they say that the owner of
land is entitled to the use of water in a well thereon in its natural
state; and that adjoining landowners have no right to limit the owner's
use thereof.75 They then determine whether there has been material
pollution by percolation of the defendant's wastes into the well of an
adjoining landowner. Such a result is declared a nuisance for which
the defendant is liable.7 6 Liability stems from the type of damage.77
One court has summarized it:
It is a well-settled law that if a person renders the water of
another impure by filth, offal or other substance to his injury,
he thereby creates a nuisance under ... the common law.78
The fact that such pollution may constitute a public (or widespread)
nuisance is no bar to recovery. It is not necessary that plaintiff alone
be affected. It is sufficient that he belongs to a class specially affected
by the pollution, and whose damages differ not only in degree but also
in kind from those of the public generally.79
Concededly, there is a narrow distinction in this field between
negligence in the act and nuisance in the result. The problem has been
placed before the courts, and they have not been without an answer.
One court ° has said:
There is a wide distinction between acts lawful in themselves,
done by one upon his own premises, which may result in injury
to another if not properly done or guarded, and those which in
the nature of things must so result. In the former case a party
can only be made liable for actual negligence in the performance
of the act while in the latter he would be liable for all the con-
sequences of his acts, whether guilty of negligence or not....
Negligence is a failure to use the degree of care required under
the particular circumstances involved; whereas nuisance does
not rest on the degree of care used, but on the degree of danger
existing, with the best of care. (emphasis supplied.)
Negligence requires that a defendant must have either acted or
failed to do so when an ordinary reasonable man would realize that
certain interests were subject to a definite class of risks. Otherwise,
legal duty is defeated."" Notice, then, becomes a necessary element in
certain cases where injury is produced from acts lawful in themselves
7 Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Donahery, 209 Okla. 1390, 238 P.2d 308 (1951).
76Pensacola Gas Co. v. Pebley, 25 Fla. 381, 5 So .593 (1889).
7r Supra, note 44.
78 Supra, note 60.79 Anstee v. Monroe Light & Fuel Co., 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920) ; Haugh's
Appeal, supra, note 23.8o Supra, note 52.
8
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and without an indication of the ultimate results. This gives rise to
a proximate causal relationship between the act and the result, and
is a foreseeable consequence of the act. 2 There is a distinction, how-
ever, between negligence and nuisance as to notice. 83 To require a
notice before one can maintain a cause of action for nuisance is to
destroy both the cause of action and the principle upon which recovery
is founded. To require notice before there is injury, in such a case,
is to give no relief to a well so polluted. 4 Since, in many jurisdictions,
as has been shown, the percolation of filth into the plaintiff's premises
would constitute a nuisance, it is not necessary to prove negligence on
the part of the defendant.8 5
In considering nuisance as a basis of liability for the pollution of a
well by percolation, the plaintiff will realize that his burden is to prove
the elements of nuisance. In sustaining this burden the plaintiff must
base his case upon the fact that the defendant is maintaining a nuisance
and that the nuisance is the cause of the damage. The court looks to
the damage and the cause of it, and not to the acts producing it.
IV. STRicr LIABILITY
The last category is sometimes called nuisance per se. This theory
is based upon the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher.8 The doctrine
is summed up in the statement that:
The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by escaping
cattle of his neighbours, or whose mine is flooded by the water
from his neighbour's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the
filth of his neighbour's privy, or whose habitation is made
unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour's
alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it
seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has
brought something on his own property which was not naturally
there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own
property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it get on his
neighbour's, should be obligated to make good the damage
which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own
property.
In Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co.8 7 the Kansas court applied this
doctrine to percolating waters. This decision is based, not upon the
statute involved, but (even in its absence) upon the defendant having
the harmful substance on his land and permitting it to escape to the
damage of the plaintiff. Once the salt water left the vicinity of the
defendant, he became liable for whatever damage resulted from its
escape.
82 Cole v. Rush, 271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954).
83 PRossR, supra, note 81, §71.
84 Supra, note 15.
85 Supra, note 34; HARPER, supra, note 81, §183.
8OL. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
87 140 Kan. 94, 33 P2d 953 (1934).
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In another case"8 the defendant stored oil in an underground tank,
which escaped, and later polluted plaintiff's well. The court, in follow-
ing Rylands v. Fletcher, said that the essential condition of liability,
without any proof of negligence on the part of the owner, for the
injury caused to others by the escape of things kept by him on his
premises, is that the natural tendency of the thing is to become a
nuisance or to do mischief, if it does escape.
One other factor can be considered under this category. It has
been held that the collection and impounding of a substance in an
artificial container, along with an escape and a percolation upon the
property of another without negligence, made defendant liable for the
resultant damage."" This idea has been carried over to include privies.
One such court9" held that a privy is regarded as a prima facie nuisance,
even though necessary and indispensible for the ordinary purposes of
habitation, if it is allowed to annoy others in the proper enjoyment
of their property, by reason of the escape of-filthy matter onto the
premises of another, so as to corrupt the water of a well or spring.
The rule of law that pertains to a privy is easily adaptable to a septic
tank by analogy.
As has been seen, this is by far the easiest theory upon which to
base liability for the contamination of a well. The defendant becomes
liable by the mere fact of the pollution. It is to be noted that nineteen
states have accepted Rylands v. Fletcher and eleven have rejected it.91
However, only two jurisdictions have expressly based liability for the
pollution of a well upon the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. Therefore,
the actual value of this theory at present, as a basis for recovery, is
doubtful.
There is one other possible solution to the problem of the corruption
of a well by percolation. Some states have met the need for the
preservation of a pure water supply by setting up regulations to protect
percolating water from infiltration.92 In such a case, liability can be
based strictly upon the statute. However, this has not been a wide-
spread practice.
There is one other aspect found in every case for the pollution of
a well that deserves special mention. Usually, the plaintiff will desire
to recover damages. If such is the case, the court will follow the general
rule and give him the difference between the value of the property
before the injury and the value after the injury. 3 The amount of
88 Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895).
89 Supra, note 53.
90 Wahl v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. 322 (1875).
91 Prosser, Recent Developments in the Law of Negligence, 9 ARx. L. RE V. & B. J.92 Generally, such statutes provide liability in broad terms. Rather than being
specific, they give a supervisory power over the water supply to a board or
commission.
93 For a discussion of this subject, see 19 A.L.R.2d 769.
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recovery will rise or fall depending upon the degree of permanency
of the injury. However, in some cases, the injured party will seek an
injunction rather than damages. An injunction is not granted if the
injury is permanent, as then there is no need for it.94 The court
determines permanency upon the facts of each case. Thus an injunction,
with or without damages, is sought only where there is a temporary
contamination of a well with a threat of continuation in the future.9 5
If an injunction is sought simply in anticipation of possible future
contamination, the court will refuse relief unless it is reasonably clear,
definite and certain, that the well will become contaminated from the
defendant's filth.96 If the result is doubtful, the injunction will be
denied.97
C. CONCLUSION
The first question that is raised in a well case is whether the right
to undefiled water is protected. If the right is not protected, the injury
is considered damnum absque injuria, unless the plaintiff is able to show
that the defendant knew of the underground water supply and knew of
the damage that would result from his placing the material so as to
injure his neighbor's well. Because of this burden, recovery is ex-
tremely rare in states following such a theory.
If, on the other hand, the jurisdiction affirms the right to undefiled
water, the next problem is that of selecting an appropriate ground upon
which to base recovery. The difficulty of relying upon trespass has
been demonstrated. Negligence, while a valid basis, gives rise to diffi-
culty in sustaining the burden of proof, since both the acts and the in-
strument that caused the injury are wholly within the control of the de-
fendant. Nuisance has certain advantages, as, it is only necessary to
show that a well has been polluted, and that defendant has maintained
the nuisance that has caused the pollution to recover on that ground.
Strict liability makes the proof of a nuisance almost a matter of fact;
but to date, only two states have expressly accepted this doctrine as ap-
plied to the pollution of a well. Because of the inherent difficulties in
the other grounds, nuisance appears to promise the greatest likelihood of
success in pollution cases.
ROBERT E. SHARP
9 Supra, note 75.9 5 Anstee v. Monroe Light & Fuel Co., supra, note 79.96tSupra, note 18; Jones v. Highland Memorial Park, 242 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Ct.
of Civ. App., 1951).9 Vandivort v. Hunter, 265 Pa. 585, 109 At. 479 (1920).
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